Balance of Power: Purposes and

Balance of Power: Purposes and Functions Various purposes and functions were attributed to the balance of power in classical theory as expounded by Bolingbroke, Gentz, Metternich, and Castlereagh. It was supposed to 1. prevent the establishment of a universal hegemony, 2. preserve the constituent elements of the system and the system itself, 3. ensure stability and mutual security in the international system and 4. strengthen and prolong the peace by deterring war, that is by confronting an aggressor with the likelihood that a policy of expansion would meet with the formation of a countercoalition. The traditional methods and techniques of maintaining or restoring the balance were a. the policy of divide and rule (working to diminish the weight of the heavier side), 2. territorial compensations after a war, 3. creating of buffer states, 4. the formation of alliances, 5. spheres of influence, 6. intervention, 7. diplomatic bargaining, 8. legal and peaceful settlement of disputes, 9. reduction of armaments, 10. armaments competition or races, and 11. war itself. A review of the list of objectives and methods will show that there were internal inconsistencies in the theory and in the practices. These were probably unavoidable, given the historic oscillation between stable and unstable equilibria within the nation-state system. If the balance of power had worked perfectly as all statesmen expected, and if the existing distribution of power had posed no threat to their national security, then the balance of power as situation, law, policy and system would almost certainly have contributed to the prolongation of peace. But the dynamics of the international political system were conducive neither to serene stability nor to prudent rational decision-making at all times. Moreover, statesmen pursuing only what they considered their own legitimate national interest---a term closely associated with the balance of power system---may have appeared in the eyes of other statesmen as conspiring to overturn the international system and gain predominance. Conversely, a government embarked upon a hegemonial path might not provoke the formation of a countercoalition until it was too late to prevent the large scale war declared to restore the balance. In theory, the balance of power policy helped preserve the peace and identity of member-states, but in practice balance of power policy sometimes led to war and to the partitioning of “less essential” actors (such as Poland in the 1790’s). But keeping the peace and preserving all the lesser members intact were subordinate to the more fundamental aims of preserving the multi-state system by observing the maxim expressed by Freidrich Gentz: “That if the states system of Europe is to exist and be maintained by common exertions no one of its members must ever become so powerful as to be able to coerce all the rest put together.” Another key concept in the classical theory must be mentioned. Under normal circumstances, with several nations seeking to maximize their power position through the various methods and techniques of balance of power politics, no one nation gains hegemony, and a precarious equilibrium is maintained. But for various reasons, the balance might be on the verge of breaking down. At this point an impartial and vigilant “holder of the balance” emerges, which is strong enough to restore the balance swiftly once it is disturbed. Historically, England played this role in the European state system. In a famous memorandum published on January 1, 1907, Sir Eyre Crowe wrote that it had “become almost a historical truism to identify England’s secular policy with the maintenance of this balance by throwing her weight now in this scale and now in that, but ever on the side opposed to the political dictatorship of the strongest single state or group at a given time. Winston Churchill reiterated this as a fundamental tenet of British foreign policy in 1936. Perhaps the theory of the balance of power, as a policy guide to statesmen, is a distinctively British theory, at least in modern times. Contending Theories of International Relations James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr