I have no idea who

I have no idea who Carroll Andrew Morse is, but he has written and published the most unenlightened commentary about Darfur that I've read yet.  And keep in mind that I've read a lot
of stupid commentary when it comes to Darfur in particular and Sudan in
general.   This one takes the cake, however.
  His solution to the crisis?  Let Darfur secede from
Sudan.    He quite reasonably begins his argument by stating
the rather obvious fact that America is more inclined to intercede in a
humanitarian disaster when said disaster is caused by Mother Nature and
not man. 

When humanitarian crises are man-made, Americans
reverse their order of response. Before trying to help, we ask, "is it
any of our business?" or "can we really make a difference in the long
run?" Remember Ethiopia? For about 30 years, civil wars, droughts, and
their combination have been killing civilians in Ethiopia. When the
primary cause of death is perceived to be drought, aid flows
generously. When the primary cause is perceived to be war, America and
the west pay much less attention.   The difference in response is
a form of triage informed by historical memory. The United States knows
that it does not have the resources to help everyone. Resources must be
directed to the places where they will do the most good. Americans do
not see attempting to alleviate the suffering caused by the Third
World's Hobbesian politics as a good use of emergency resources. Even
if immediate aid fixes the situation today, the political circumstances
that created the problem will still be there tomorrow. So, when
Americans hear about yet another third-world government massacring its
citizens, we make a cold but rational choice not to overly involve
ourselves in a situation that we probably cannot resolve. Better to
save our efforts for one-time events like natural disasters.   The
consensus of despair magnifies the power of dictators. Democratic
leaders are slow to advocate foreign interventions, even for noble
humanitarian purposes. Driven by domestic political calculations, they
fear (justifiably) that the magnitude of commitment involved in fixing
broken states will frighten their constituents. Meanwhile, the measures
that do garner public support -- UN resolutions and amorphous ideas of
"diplomatic pressure" -- cannot be effective unless backed by a
credible threat of force. The result is a vicious cycle. Dictators
expand their intrastate power by the most violent means possible,
knowing that the outside world is fearful of intervening in situations
where violence is too extreme.   The cycle can be broken. There
are steps that lie between the poles of military intervention and
quietist non-involvement. Nations unwilling to tolerate Sudan's state
sponsored program of killing can derecognize Sudan's legal control over
Darfur and support the secession of western Sudan. If the outside world
cannot solve the problems in Sudan, it can remove Sudan from the
problems.

True, so very true.  But what follows isn't.
 

Recognizing the secession of oppressed provinces of failed states should be a part of the standard diplomatic toolkit. Do we not agree that every reasonable non-violent alternative should proceed the use of force? Recognizing secession is a non-violent option, though one that is rarely mentioned. Somehow, the international system has evolved to a point where threatening to derecognize a savage government is considered unthinkable while allowing hundreds of thousands to starve to death is considered business-as-usual. Arguments that recognizing western Sudan as an independent state will lead to violence are not compelling. The violence is already out of control. Doing nothing only enables its continuation.   Endorsing western Sudan's secession is a reasonable course of action given Sudan's utter failure as a state. For democrats and humanitarians, Sudan's failure is beyond obvious. For those agnostic about democracy so long as state machinery delivers efficient rule, Sudan is still a monumental failure. And for hard-headed realists, disinterested in domestic tranquility, so long as the stability of the international system limits and regulates of the use of force, preserving Sudan is of no value. Since 1955, Sudan has been engaged in a brutal winner-take-all contest for power and prestige that comes from legal control of a populous nation. Removing the prize will reduce the violence.

Spare me.  This man knows absolutely nothing about Sudan.  If he did, perhaps he might have dropped a hint that secession from the northern, ruling government is precisely what the south wants.  In all of his research over what a great option this would be for Darfur, did he just miss the fact that the south just signed a peace accord with the north to ensure a vote on that exact eventuality six years hence?  And that the north isn't really all that pleased about it?   Type "Navaisha Accords" into Google and this is what you come up with.   Is this man actually trying to tell his readers that he was completely unaware of how this hard-fought peace treaty is gumming up the international aid works when it comes to Darfur?  And how southern secession has been a major stumbling block in getting the accords signed in the first place? Or is he simply someone who is trying to make a case for a favorite argument using Darfur as Exhibit A?    Let me sum it up for Mr. Morse: the south is where all the oil is; the north has been waging a war against the southerners, who want autonomy, for over twenty years now; the international community (read France and Russia, to name a few) doesn't want those accords to go down the tubes over government supported genocide in Darfur.  But they don't want to piss off the people they've inked the deals with, either: they're willing to look the other way because peace is on its way to being established, the oil will soon flow and if southern Sudan votes to become independent, well, they've got a whole six years before that happens to ink new deals with the people who might be in charge at that point in time.  Secession is not something the northern government likes.  They don't think it a good option on the whole.   Why, exactly, would the Sudanese government let Darfur secede when they've set the precedent that secession is not viable?    Yes, yes.  Darfur doesn't have any natural resources to speak of.  Secession might theoretically be possible.  But why would Sudan let Darfur secede? And it would be a case of letting them secede: it could only happen with the Sudanese government's permission.   Theory doesn't go very far before reality intrudes, does it?  Let's look at the facts.    

1. The region's been ethnically cleansed; it's fresh and shiny; what possible reason, now that the black Africans have bugged out for safer territory---something that the legally recognized government of Sudan let happen and participated in---would they want to let them run the show?   What would all the expenditure in men and materiel have been about it if they just let the region become autonomous?  
2. If you think that Iraq is unwieldy in a sheer territorial sense, then you'd better take a good look at a map when it comes to Darfur.  How would it be possible to enforce such a secession, because Sudan, sure as the sun will rise in the morning, will not want to give it up and will have no qualms about using their superior military to prevent such an outcome.  And let's be clear about the Sudanese Army's superiority: would the refugees have run if they were armed?  Are we now going to arm them to ensure that the secession succeeds?  
3. So, if the international community takes Mr. Morse's recommendation in Darfur and legally recognizes the new country, while internationally isolating the old, they're essentially solving the problem of Darfur on the backs of the southern Sudanese.  Because Darfur could just break off and that would solve that problem, wouldn't it? 

But it still leaves the problem of the south, where there is still no cease fire to back up the peace accords: full scale civil war could break out again.  Given that the south is where the oil is, what do you think is the potential for a Darfur secession are within the international community? 

  Bupkiss.   You have to give me a better, more realistic argument before you can tell me this is the best option for Darfur and will end the violence.  Because chances are, it won't. Posted by Kathy at July 1, 2004 12:13 PM | TrackBack