Henry A. Kissinger Another scholar

Henry A. Kissinger Another scholar who has drawn from history---in this case, diplomatic history---is Henry A. Kissinger. Kissinger’s theory of international relations is derived from his analysis of early nineteenth century Europe. In A World Restored, based on his doctoral dissertation, Kissinger wrote: “The success of physical science depends upon the selection of the “crucial” experiment; that of political science in the field of international affairs, on the selection of the “crucial” period. I have chosen for my topic, the period between 1812 and 1822, partly, I am frank to say, because its problems seem to me analogous to those of our day. But I do not insist on this analogy.” Kissinger’s fascination with this period lies in the insights that might be provided in that the exercise of power by statesmen such as Castlereagh and Metternich for the development of an international structure that contributed to peace in the century between the Congress of Vienna and the outbreak of WWI. Kissinger studied the nature and quality of political leadership, the impact of domestic political structures upon foreign policy, and the relationship between diplomacy and military policy in stable and revolutionary international systems. As Stephen R. Graubard has written: “Kissinger saw choice as fundamental to the whole political process. It was of greatest consequence to him that a given state opted for a specific policy for one reason rather than another: because its bureaucracy determined that here was only one safe course; because its leaders were anxious to test the adversary’s reactions; because domestic opinion demanded a specific policy; because the political leadership was confused and saw the necessity of creating the illusion that it as still capable of action.” Drawing heavily upon the 1815 to 1822 period, Kissinger postulates that peace is achieved not as an end in itself, but instead emerges as the result of a stable, contrasted with revolutionary, international system. Therefore Kissinger develops two models for the study of international politics: first, a stable system; and second, a revolutionary system. He contends that stability has resulted not “from a quest for peace but from a general accepted legitimacy.” By Kissinger’s definition, legitimacy means “no more than an international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about permissible aims and methods of foreign policy.” Legitimacy implies an acceptance of the framework of the international order by all the major powers. Agreement among major powers upon the framework of international order does not eliminate international conflicts, but it limits their scope. Conflict within the framework has been more limited than conflict about the framework. Diplomacy, which Kissinger defines as “the adjustment of differences through negotiation,” becomes possible only in the international systems where “legitimacy obtains.” In Kissinger’s model the primary objective of national actors is not to preserve the peace. In fact, “wherever peace---conceived as the avoidance of war---has been the primary objective of a power or a group of powers, the international system has been at the mercy of the most ruthless members of the international community.” In contrast, “whenever the international order has acknowledged that certain principles could not be compromised even for the sake of peace, stability based upon an equilibrium of forces was at least conceivable.” {…} In other writings Kissinger has applied concepts derived from his study of early nineteenth century European diplomatic history to the contemporary international system. The problems posed by the great destructive potential of nuclear weapons have been of great concern to him. As in the past, it is necessary for nations to develop limited means to achieve limited objectives. “An all or nothing military policy will…play into the hands of the Soviet strategy of ambiguity which seeks to upset the strategic balance by small degrees and which combines political, psychological and military pressures to induce the greatest degree of uncertainty and hesitation in the mind of the opponent.” If United States policy makers are to have a choice other than “the dread alternatives of surrender or suicide,” they must adopt concepts of limited war derived from the experience of nineteenth-century warfare. At that time the objective of warfare “was to create a calculus of risks according to which continued resistance would appear more costly than the peace sought to be imposed.” A strategy of limited warfar would provide the United States with the means to “establish a reasonable relationship between power and the willingness to use it, between the physical and psychological components of national policy.” Writing in the 1960’s, Kissinger contended that if the United States was to avoid the stark alternatives of suicide or surrender, it must have both large-scale conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons. Kissinger established three requirements for limited war capabilities. 1.The limited war forces must be able to prevent the potential aggressor from creating a fait accompli. 2.They must be of a nature to convince the aggressor that their use, although invoking an increasing risk of all-out war, is not an inevitable prelude to it. 3.They must be coupled with a diplomacy which succeeds in conveying that all-out war is not the sole response to aggression and that there exists a willingness to negotiate a settlement short of unconditional surrender. If nations are to evolved a limited war strategy, they must develop an understanding of those interests that do not threaten national survival. Decision makers must possess the ability to restrain public opinion if disagreement arises as to whether national survival is at stake. Given a tacit understanding among nations about the nature of limited objectives, it is possible to fight both conventional conflicts and limited nuclear wars without escalation to total war. In the adjustment of differences between nations, Kissinger, like most other realists, assigns an important role to diplomacy. Historically, negotiation was aided by the military capabilities a nation could bring to bear if diplomacy failed. The vast increase in destructive capabilities has contributed to the perpetuation of disputes. “Our age faces the paradoxical problem that because the violence of war has grown all out of proportion to the objectives achieved, no issue has been resolved.” {…} Like Morganthau, Kissinger views with disfavor the injection of ideology into the international system. Ideology not only contributes to the development of unlimited national objectives, but it also eventually creates states whose goal is to overthrow the existing international system. In the absence of agreement among powers about the framework for the system---or its legitimacy---the conduct of diplomacy becomes difficult, even impossible. Hence the emphasis in the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger foreign policy upon creating stable structure for the international system: “All nations, adversaries and friends alike, must have a stake in preserving the international system. They must feel that their principles are being respected and their national interests secured. They must, in short, see positive incentive for keeping the peace, not just the dangers of breaking it.” {…} Realist writers, Kissinger included, have often sought to separate domestic politics from foreign policy. The conduct of an effective diplomacy is said to be difficult, if not impossible, if it must be subject, both in its conception and execution, to the continuous scrutiny of public opinion in a democracy such as in the United States. Flexibility, characteristic of Kissinger’s style of diplomacy, can be achieved in secrecy more easily than in a policy process open to the glare of publicity. But the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy has been another dimension for realists, and especially for Kissinger. Unlike those who subscribe to the Wilsonian idealism or utopianism, Kissinger does not seek to transform domestic political structures in the belief that democratic political systems are a prerequisite for a peaceful world. “We shall never condone the suppression of fundamental liberties. We shall urge humane principles and use our influence to promote justice. But the issue comes down to the limits of such efforts. How hard can we press without provoking the Soviet leadership into returning to practices in its foreign policy that increase international tensions? ... For half a century we have objected to Communist efforts to alter the domestic structures of other countries. For a generation of Cold War we sought to ease the risks produced by competing ideologies. Are we not to come full circle and insist on domestic compatibility of progress?” Here Kissinger’s theory of international relations contrasts sharply with the view that a precondition for the development of a stable relationship with the Soviet Union is the transformation of its political system to conform with the principles of human rights and political freedom cherished in the West. At most, the easing of tensions between states is a complex process, dependent upon diplomacy, mutual interest, and “a strong military balance and flexible defense posture.” In short, foreign policy should be based on national power and interest, rather than abstract moralistic principles or political crusades. Nevertheless, in Kissinger’s theory of international relations the domestic political structure of states is a key element. His stable and revolutionary system models of international politics, noted earlier, are linked to the domestic political structures of states in either system. Stale international regimes are characterized by actors whose domestic political structures are based on compatible notions about means and goals of foreign policies. By definition, governments with stable domestic political structures do not resort to revolutionary or adventuristic foreign policies to restore or preserve domestic cohesion. In contrast, revolutionary systems contain actors whose domestic political structures contrast sharply with each other. {…}

Contending Theories of International Relations James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr