Critiques of Balance of PowerIn

Critiques of Balance of PowerIn recent decades, the balance of power theory has encountered much criticism even from traditional analysts, and for reasons other than the semantic vagueness mentioned earlier. Nicholas J. Spykman held that the theory inadequately expressed the practice: “The truth of the matter is that states are interested only in balance (imbalance) which is in their favor. Not an equilibrium, but a generous margin is their objective. There is no real security in being just as strong as a potential enemy; there is security only in being a little stronger. There is no possibility of action if one’s strength is fully checked; there is a chance for a positive foreign policy only if there is a margin of force which can be used freely.” Hans J. Morgenthau finds the balance of power deficient on several grounds. It has failed on a number of occasions since the end of the eighteenth century to preserve the independent existence of states. The multistate system precluding a single state from achieving universal domination has been preserved only at a price of frequent and costly wars. He finds the balance of power 1. uncertain because no completely reliable means of measuring, evaluating and comparing power exist; 2. unreal because statesmen try to compensate for its uncertainty by aiming for superiority; and 3. inadequate for explaining national restraint during most of the years from 1648 to 1914 because it does not give credit to the restraining influence of the basic intellectual unity and moral consensus then prevailing in Europe. Ernst B. Haas has observed that using the balance of power as a policy guide assumes a high degree of flexibility in national decision making. The vigilant political leader must engage in a constant power calculus and be ready to enter into a countervailing coalition, regardless of ideological differences, economic interests, and domestic political attitudes. Haas had questioned the degree to which policymakers, especially in democratic countries, can enjoy the kind of flexibility that the balance of power theory would seem to demand. It should be pointed out, however, that the Anglo-American democracies managed to overcome their aversion to Soviet communism in WWII against Nazi Germany, and in more recent decades, the United States has apparently sought to play a balance of power game vis-à-vis the People’s Republic of China and the {former} Soviet Union. Kenneth N. Waltz had defended the balance of power theory against critics who, in his view, have misunderstood certain crucial points. Every theory, he argues, must begin with some assumptions. He assumes that are unitary actors that see, at a minimum, to preserve themselves, and at a maximum, to dominate others if possible. They strive to achieve their objectives through internal efforts (e.g. strengthening their own alliance and weakening that of the adversary). He then adds the condition that states are operating in a self-help system with no superior referee. Thos who do not help themselves as well as others do will become disadvantaged. Assumptions, Waltz points out, are neither true nor false, but they are essential for the construction of a theory. In Waltz’s theory of structural realism, the balance of power is rooted inescapably and necessarily in the international system of states. Thus he parts company with other theorists of the balance of power---Hume, Churchill, Organski, Morgenthau, Haas, Kissinger, and others---who have held that the balance of power policy is something to be followed voluntarily by wise and prudent political leaders. For Waltz, the tendency toward equilibrium is automatic, regardless of whether “some or all states consciously aim to establish and maintain a balance, or whether some or all states aim for universal domination.” If the results to be produced (i.e. balance) depend upon some or all states’ consciously working for it, then international politics can be explained by theories of national bureaucratic policymaking, and an international balance of power theory would have nothing to explain. Waltz wants a theory applicable to the international system irrespective of the behavior of particular states. Contending Theories of International Relations James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr